Source: SunSentinel Author: James G. Driscoll, Editorial Writer Pubdate: 7 Dec 97 Contact: For LTEs we suggest using the form at: http://www.sunsentinel.com/SunServe/letters_editor.htm A Special Editorial Page Report HALTING A DEADLY TRADE: AMERICA'S WAR ON DRUGS For excellent reasons, no one praises the nation's war against drugs as a model of efficiency. Instead, despite current close cooperation among law enforcement agencies, America's long struggle to shed its dangerous drug habit has been marked by fragmented efforts from thousands of worried, deeply committed people. To say it's chaotic would be too strong. It's more like a disjointed crusade to cut narcotics abuse to an irreducible minimum. Envision a map of North and South America, and think of a path shaped like a crescent drawn northward from Colombia through the Caribbean Sea and into Florida. For this region, the crusade is waged along that crescent of supply and demand; elsewhere, the battle is fought, literally, worldwide. Put another way, antidrug campaigners are wielding a scalpel, sometimes awkwardly, trying to remove a cancer that sickens the United States and saps its strength. Unless this malignant addiction is mostly excised from national life, America will continue to lose hundreds of thousands of its sons and daughters every year to the destructive lure of cocaine, heroin, marijuana and other drugs. In a series of editorials starting today, the SunSentinel examines the war against drugs in its major aspects and offers forceful recommendations to make the battle more successful. The inseparable two sides of the antidrug coin, supply and demand, are the framework within which the editorials are written. Toss the coin in the air, and if it lands showing the supply side, that means this nation's unrelenting actions to block the growing, processing and transporting of illegal drugs into the United States. If the coin reveals the demand side, it signifies the gritty, largely unsung push to prevent children and teenagers from experimenting with narcotics their first stumble toward personal hell and to treat and rehabilitate those who have fallen into dependency on drugs. Both sides of the antidrug coin must be seen, and acted on with great vigor, or the narcotics cancer will spread and engulf more and more of America's youngsters. The urgency of intensifying the war against drugs right now, and of embarking on new tactics while stepping up existing ones that are successful, is caused by the frightening rise in children's drug use for five consecutive years. This image illustrates the unforgiving reality of America's heartbreak over drugs: Actor Carroll O'Connor, anguish lining his face and cracking his voice, asks parents to ``get between your kids and drugs, any way you can.'' In this television spot, the grieving O'Connor reminds parents that his son committed suicide after a painful and losing fight against drug addiction. Hugh O'Connor died at 32, but his slide to disaster began many years earlier, as a teenager. COLOMBIA'S CORRUPT SAMPER WON'T LAST, BUT U.S. POLICY SHOULD When Colombia's excuses about drug lords and corruption grate intolerably on U.S. sensibilities, and anger intensifies, drastic ideas pop out from otherwise rational Americans: The United States should invade Colombia. Or bomb it into rubble. Or try to strangle the economic life out of it by imposing an embargo like the one on Cuba. Any of those hotheaded options would inevitably harm millions of honest Colombians, many of whom risk their lives to fight against immensely rich and powerful drug interests. After they cool down, frustrated Americans realize the unfairness of their own ideas, and also understand every other nation in the hemisphere would oppose them vigorously. It's better to be practical and realistic. No matter how many times Colombian President Ernesto Samper breaks his promises on antidrug moves, it's encouraging to remember that he too shall pass. Soon. By next August, the corrupt Samper will be gone from the presidential palace, and a successor will take over. The new president will be chosen by Colombia's voters in what is hoped to be a free and open election. Before October's municipal elections in Colombia, rebels with drug ties intimidated voters and candidates in some sections of the country, forcing them to stay away from the polls or withdraw from races. To prevent a recurrence will require firm action by the Colombian government which may or may not happen. Right now, as Samper fades from political view, U.S. policymakers have an excellent opening to plan for his successor's fouryear term and for the decade following. Both short and longrange policies should be debated thoroughly within the U.S. government, and a creative mindset will help. The oneonone relationship between the U.S. and Colombia demands intensive scrutiny, but so does the growing interest in multinational efforts to combat drugs throughout the hemisphere. In a sense drug cartels operate like multinational corporations, frequently crossing national borders to buy and sell their goods, and those who fight against them must do likewise. The scourge of narcotics extends to every nation in the Western Hemisphere. First, though, there's the extradition issue and ``Samper's promise,'' a laughable oxymoron. Samper promised to push through a new law allowing Colombian drug criminals to be extradited to the U.S. or elsewhere, so they can be tried before stern judges who will send them to bleak prisons. A new law was approved by Colombia's Congress in late November, with a huge loophole to protect Cali drug kingpins already in Colombian jails. Samper was notable for his weakness in the process, watching passively. The U.S. wanted to stop the infuriating farce in which Colombian courts impose shamefully light sentences on convicted drug kingpins. To make it worse, cartel leaders live in luxurious surroundings in socalled jails, while continuing to run drug empires. Nothing is more demoralizing to law enforcement agents. And nothing sets a worse example for young Colombians, who may choose a life of drug crime because ``punishment'' is so ridiculously soft. The new law, outrageous as it is in shielding the sorry hides of Cali cartel bosses Miguel and Gilberto Rodriguez Orejuela, is still much better than nothing. The U.S. should continue to criticize the escape hatch and press Samper's successor to change it, but meanwhile move to extradite major drug criminals arrested from now on. Next on the shortterm agenda is certification or continued decertification next year of Colombia as a drugfighting ally. For the past two years, Colombia has been decertified, meaning the U.S. decided there was too much corruption connected to narcotics and too little action against drugs. To abandon this weapon now would be a mistake. Better to use it as a carrotandstick to persuade the Colombian government to take stronger action against drug criminals, or face economic sanctions. If certification is wielded as a bludgeon, however, it could backfire. If Colombian political leaders conclude there's no chance for certification, what incentive will they have to toughen their antidrug laws? Deft diplomacy is therefore essential. The Colombians should understand the possibility, if they actually follow through on most of their antidrug plans, of moving one step up the certification ladder. That wouldn't be full certification, but what is called ``vital interest certification.'' The U.S. could declare as it now does with Belize, Lebanon and Pakistan that while Colombia falls short of full antidrug cooperation, its efforts were substantial enough to qualify for a form of certification because U.S. vital interests are involved. What interests? It hardly matters, but one could be the continuing need for the U.S. to shore up Colombia's antidrug efforts. None of this is to suggest the certification process is fair. One American correctly called it odious, arrogant and unilateral. For now, though, certification should be kept intact. If and when a broader, multinational attack on drugs can replace it, that's the time to pack away this arrogant but useful weapon. COLOMBIA'S PLAN TO STAMP OUT DRUGS ISN'T WORKING No one doubts that Colombia remains the focal point of the international cocaine trade, nor its recent emergence as a source of potent heroin. Whether Colombia qualifies as the worst drug offender in the Western Hemisphere, however, is open to argument, with some law enforcement officers contending Mexico does even less to combat drugs. Despite President Ernesto Samper's dalliance with drug lords, and his behindthescenes sabotage of antidrug legislation, Colombia still has made modest progress. The 100,000member national police force, for example, is credited with courageous confrontation of drug traffickers; this applies mostly to an elite, 2,500person antidrug unit of gutsy police officers. Some segments of the Colombian military forces have distanced themselves from corrupt colleagues, and worked to eradicate illegal crops of coca and poppies. In Colombia's Congress, after sustained pressure from the nation's private sector, an asset forfeiture law was passed; it will go into effect, applying to drug criminals, unless a constitutional challenge succeeds. Money laundering, which is woven tightly into the cocaine trade, was made a crime in 1995. The weak law means little, however, because it's not being enforced. Much too often, that's the standard in Colombia. Sometimes, it's even worse than just standing still. As part of its official 1995 antinarcotics plan to comply, however reluctantly, with the 1988 United Nations Convention against drugs Colombia pledged to eradicate illicit crops within two years. Instead, despite the destruction of some crops in the field, the total amount of coca acreage in Colombia increased by 32 percent in a year. Obviously, the grand plan isn't working. In some aspects Colombia is slipping backward, setting teeth on edge in the U.S. and among honest Colombians. If the U.S. government pushes too hard, there's a possibility Colombia will become further destabilized, with rebel forces grabbing more of the countryside. For the long term, the most promising course is to shift much of the antidrug effort to multinational mechanisms, formal or informal. That way, Colombian resentment against American pressure will be blunted as will the resentment's impact on elections and Colombians could say truthfully that specific antidrug measures were agreed to by many nations in a democratic process. On Sept. 26, the State Department published an 18page analysis and proposal advocating a counternarcotics alliance for the hemisphere. Except for its inexplicable failure to give prominent emphasis to reducing demand for drugs it was barely mentioned the proposal offers solid suggestions that could, over time, create a more effective offensive against narcotics. Simple, streamlined approaches may be the most effective, as in the existing cooperation among the U.S., Peru and Colombia to shut down the drug ``air bridge'' between the latter two nations. The wellcoordinated effort against drugladen airplanes heading from Peru's cocagrowing regions to Colombia's processing laboratories succeeded so well that Peru's cultivation of drug crops dropped sharply. For more complex issues, though, formal agreements and organizations probably will be needed. As long as antidrug efforts aren't bogged down by paperwork and the creaky bureaucracy of international organizations, they have a chance to succeed. In the difficult tasks of sophisticated criminal investigations, moves to halt money laundering, confiscation of chemicals used to process drugs and plans to not only destroy coca and poppy fields but to offer farmers reasonable alternative crops in all those areas, expert advice and detailed training are vital. Many hermispheric nations by themselves aren't equipped with the institutions, traditions and knowledge to cope with those issues. The Organization of American States, through its InterAmerican Drug Abuse Control Commission, already is active in this field and could expand its work to give badly needed advice and guidance to nations seeking help. Among other daunting and delicate tasks, the OAS commission could be asked to monitor progress of each country in meeting its own antidrug plan. Not only would measurement devices have to be developed and accepted, the OAS would have to mollify egos and soothe sensitivities in each nation. A dizzying array of other international groups and task forces, both wellestablished and new, also are involved in drug issues. A sensible overall goal would be to settle on two or three multinational groups to give training and carry out such admirable ideas as establishing a Latin American Judicial Center, which would try to bring the hemisphere's judicial systems into the modern era. Next April at the Summit of the Americas in Santiago, Chile, more steps will be considered to build a counternarcotics alliance. No realist expects the overall process to be quick or without delays and disputes. Still, it must move forward. The current fragmented antidrug efforts are effective only sporadically, and the multinational approach at least holds promise. A MAN OF INTEGRITY COULD HAVE IMPACT BOGOTA, Colombia An 18yearold Colombian from the slums buys a $20 million building, for cash, and no one questions the deal. A government commission that's supposed to oversee realestate transactions shuts its eyes and fails to ask the teenager, who never before had 300 pesos (30 cents) to ride a bus, how he miraculously obtained such a giant pile of money. Of course the commission won't ask. That would be dangerous. And what are bribes for, if not to protect Colombia's drug criminals who provide them? To Alfonso Valdivieso, a presidential candidate who denounces with equal vigor drug criminals and corrupt politicians who accept their bribes, such blatant transactions demonstrate how narcotics interests permeate this staggering nation of 37 million beleagured citizens. If elected president, Valdivieso says, he would halt those drugdrenched deals, among many other steps to restore Colombia to world respectability. Is Valdivieso to be believed? Could he or anyone else really untangle Colombia from the lucrative drug trade, while defeating or coming to terms with two rebel armies that control 40 percent of the countryside, wiping out human rights abuses by paramilitaries and regaining the world's trust? At first impression, Valdivieso hardly looks like a dragon slayer or even a moderately attractive politician for the TV age. He's short, 5feet6 at most, and refuses to speak in simplistic sound bites. Yet he radiates energy and decisiveness, his thick mustache bristling with outrage at the drugdriven disaster that grips Colombia so tightly. Never before have I seen a mustache actually bristle, but there's no temptation to laugh because Valdivieso is all business and obviously means precisely what he says. As he briskly outlines his plans, it becomes apparent why this former attorney general of Colombia is referred to as a man of integrity. He may be short, but he's decidedly not small nor lacking in either personal courage or intellectual subtlety. Valdivieso says he'll never back down from drug lords, no matter how powerful or threatening, and my inclination is to take him at his word. The questions then become: Could he carry out his ideas? Will he get the chance, considering that Horacio Serpa, the handpicked candidate of corrupt incumbent President Ernesto Samper, holds a large lead over all other contenders in early polls? After Valdivieso resigned as attorney general in disgust over Samper's shameful corruption, he and his backers rigorously analyzed his chances to win the presidency. They realize the SamperSerpa duo is more experienced and can draw on an existing organization to bring out sympathetic or bribed voters. Valdivieso, though, decided to barge ahead, hoping for a strong enough showing to finish second to Serpa in the primary voting next May 31, and then pushing hard to win the runoff the following month. From a wellguarded house tucked into a culdesac and transformed into a campaign headquarters, Valdivieso and a small band of colleagues are battling for public attention. His honesty in refusing to take popular stances won't help at the polls. Unlike most Colombian and other Latin American politicians, for instance, Valdivieso declines to pound the antiU.S. drum about the demand for drugs to the north. The U.S. must curb its appetite for cocaine and heroin, he says, but that doesn't mean Colombia should downplay its own huge contributions to hemispheric drug misery: growing, producing and trafficking in narcotics. Above all, Valdivieso argues intensely, Colombia must deal with entrenched political corruption generated by drugs. He never mentions his former boss, President Samper, but the implication is unmistakable. Samper is accused of accepting at least $6 million in drug bribes, and few knowledgeable observers doubt his guilt, despite a highly suspect whitewash by Colombia's Senate. Not too many years ago, when Colombia was less corrupt and more respected, the mythical Juan Valdez sort of symbolized the country in the U.S. As you'll recall, Valdez starred in commercials, searching Colombian mountain slopes for perfect coffee trees and beans. Maybe that's not the symbol preferred by serious Colombians, but it's far superior to the current one: a drug lord living in obscene luxury, even while in ``prison.'' Under Serpa, that wouldn't change. With Valdivieso as president, it might. INTERNATIONAL PRESSURE IS CRITICAL On Oct. 8, Eduardo A. Gamarra of Florida International University testified in Washington before the House Committee on International Relations, subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere. A native of Bolivia, Gamarra is an associate professor and assistant director of FIU's Latin American and Caribbean Canter. Here are excerpts from his remarks about South America. Overall, the battle against drug trafficking and related crimes in South America has a very mixed record. . . . No matter how much effort, resources and time is dedicated to this phenomenon, it appears to grow larger and to become increasingly more sophisticated. . . . Transnational narcotics trafficking and related crimes have no nationality; in 1997, every single South American country has been touched by the industry in some way. Moreover, the presence of Nigerian, Russian, Italian and other organized criminal organizations reveals the global nature of this problem. . . . Despite these odds South American countries have demonstrated an important degree of political will to combat illegal drugs and related crimes. . . . The fact is that most South Americans and their governments are not drug traffickers. . . . A striking conclusion derived from interviews with government officials in two countries is that without a degree of international pressure, governments appear less likely to abide by the terms of the international agreements they have signed. . . . Without intensive international pressure, the governments of the region may be inclined to pursue other, less punitive avenues to combat drugs. . . . At the core, the problem has to do with ageold questions of governability and political stability. And this reality presents the international community with a very serious dilemma: relentlessly pursuing the implementation of international counterdrug accords could have serious repercussions for the political stability of individual countries. In some places, the very survival of countries and their governments may be threatened. . . . This is not an endorsement of the certification process. On the contrary, the record reveals that while the affected governments may indeed carry out more effective and punitive counternarcotics campaigns, the destabilizing impact on the economy and the political system of a country like Colombia may erode whatever gains are made in the counternarcotics area. . . . A striking and unintended result of certification is the increasing popularity of individuals singled out by U.S. officials for their alleged linkages to drug traffickers. The only obvious conclusion is that there is a serious and urgent need to establish international monitoring mechanisms that the region can live with. . . But the key question is how to wage an effective counternarcotics effort that does not subvert basic democratic rights and affect governance. To that end, the following should become important elements of the present strategy: Prioritize democratic and civilian control over all law enforcement and military efforts. Continue institutional reform efforts, especially judiciaries. . . . Continue the trend toward multilateralization of counternarcotics efforts by supporting the role of the OAS. . . . Involve development banks, nongovernmental organizations, the European Union, the United Nations in the current efforts. Rethink current unilateral certification policy and develop multilateral monitoring mechanisms as an alternative. At a minimum develop clear, achievable goals in each country. . . . Increase multilateral resources to noninterdiction strategies, especially alternative development programs for coca farmers in Bolivia, Colombia and Peru. U.S. POLICY SHIFTS NOTICED OVER TIME In the past three years, Colombian political scientist Andres Franco of Javeriana University has noticed distinct shifts in U.S. policy toward Colombia. A Ph.D. candidate at the University of Miami, Franco says in 1994, just after Ernesto Samper was elected president and scandals about him began to emerge, the United States adopted a ``chorus of diplomacy'' that was directed, negatively, at the entire nation of Colombia. By early 1996, when the evidence of Samper's personal corruption had become overwhelming, the U.S. seemed to decide it was unwise to criticize and hurt Colombia as a whole. Instead, says Franco, the U.S. cancelled Samper's visa so he couldn't travel to this country and tried to isolate him, limiting his official contacts with Americans to infrequent talks with U.S. Ambassador Myles Frechette. By early 1997, that approach had been modified to what Franco calls ``fragmented cooperation.'' The U.S would work with specific ``good guys'' in Colombia's government, police, military and the private sector, but not with Samper and others linked to drug corruption. Now the reality of Colombia as a formal democracy compels the United States to look ahead. Samper's term ends next summer, and Colombian voters will choose a new president to replace him. U.S. policy toward Colombia after next year's election will be influenced, although not dictated, by whether the new president is a ``good guy'' or has been bought by drug interests. Copyright © 1997, SunSentinel Company and South Florida Interactive, Inc.