Pubdate: Mon, 28 Dec 2015
Source: Globe and Mail (Canada)
Copyright: 2015 The Globe and Mail Company
Contact:  http://www.theglobeandmail.com/
Details: http://www.mapinc.org/media/168
Author: Frances Woolley
Note: Associate dean and professor of economics at Carleton University
Page: A12

MARIJUANA MONOPOLY: THREE PROBLEMS WITH WYNNE'S PLAN

Ontario Premier Kathleen Wynne is the latest leader to advocate 
distributing marijuana through provincial liquor control boards, 
should Ottawa legalize the drug. It is not an entirely stupid idea. 
Yet it will encounter three intractable problems.

First, there is a fundamental conflict between harm prevention and 
revenue maximization. The LCBO may talk about the millions of times 
each year underage would-be drinkers, or the obviously inebriated, 
are denied service. Yet the ugly truth is that the alcoholic who 
stops by his local Liquor Control Board of Ontario to buy a bottle of 
whisky every day or two is more likely to be greeted with a friendly 
"Good day, sir" than a health warning.

Heavy consumers of alcohol are the mainstay of the LCBO's revenue 
base; the agency has little incentive to persuade them to stop 
drinking. As my Carleton colleague Jean Daudelin, who has studied 
drug markets in Canada and elsewhere, argues, "any kind of business 
model which is geared mainly to generating revenue creates incentives 
that are not compatible with any rational public health policy." 
There is no reason to believe that liquor control boards would 
curtail heavy cannabis use any more ( or less) effectively than they 
do alcoholism.

Second, it is not obvious how recreational marijuana sales will co- 
exist with the already existing market for medical marijuana. 
Canada's tax system divides ( legal) drugs into two distinct 
categories. There are medicines, which are taxed lightly, if at all, 
and there are recreational drugs, such as alcohol and tobacco, which 
are subject to heavy excise or "sin" taxes. How many serious users 
will want to buy heavily taxed recreational marijuana from the local 
"Liquor and Cannabis Control Board," when they could use medical 
marijuana instead and claim it as a medical expense on their income-tax return?

The third stubborn problem the legal pot industry must face is 
competing with home and black market production. Marijuana producers 
and distributors who wish to participate in the legal market will 
have to pay a whole range of taxes, from HST and excise taxes to the 
income, payroll and other taxes every Canadian business is expected 
to pay. Small-scale home production and tax-evading black-market 
production faces none of these costs.

To compete with untaxed home- and black-market operations, legal 
producers must be able to grow marijuana so efficiently that they 
cover the cost of taxation and legal distribution, yet are still 
competitive with home- and black-market production in terms of price 
and quality. The markets for alcohol and tobacco show how this is 
done: globalization plus large-scale capital intensive production. 
Half of the tobacco cigarettes sold ( legally) in Canada are produced 
by just one company, Imperial Tobacco Canada Ltd., and manufactured 
in Mexico. The LCBO actively attempts to promote Ontario wines and 
beer, but makes its money elsewhere. Ontario wines account for only 7 
per cent of the LCBO's sales, and Ontario craft beers account for 
less than 1 per cent. If cannabis were legal, what reason is there to 
think that the market for marijuana would not show the same 
tendencies toward globalized, capital-intensive production that 
tobacco, alcohol and so many other products exhibit r! ight now?

There are alternatives. There are models out there that might - just 
might - allow the Canadian cannabis industry to flourish, mitigate 
harm to users and, at the same time, generate tax revenue.

One option is to stick with the current model of medicinal use only, 
forgo the potential tax revenue that could be raised from 
recreational marijuana and focus only on harm reduction. This model 
assumes that doctors are effective gatekeepers and marijuana is 
sufficiently harmful that recreational use should be banned. Both 
assumptions are dubious.

The Colorado model is another alternative worth studying. Marijuana 
sellers in Colorado operate under a similar regime to Ontario craft 
breweries: They sell only ( or mostly) cannabis that they produce 
themselves. Retail licences are available only to marijuana 
cultivators and there are limits to the number of plants each 
producer can cultivate ( the full set of rules runs to 209 frequently 
impenetrable pages).

The Colorado model appears to have achieved two key policy objectives 
- - protecting existing producers and raising some amount of tax 
revenue. But it is not without problems. As cannabis is still illegal 
in the United States, entrepreneurs are reluctant to invest capital 
into marijuana production. Yet without capital investment, legal 
producers are left using the same growing and harvesting technologies 
as illegal ones. With a similar cost structure, and higher regulatory 
and tax burdens, it is a challenge for legal producers to compete.

A final option would be to use marijuana legalization as an 
opportunity to rethink existing liquor distribution structures, 
especially in Ontario. It is sometimes not understood ( in Ontario, 
anyway) that it is possible for a province to retain a monopoly on 
liquor ( or cannabis) distribution at the wholesale level, and at the 
same time have competition at the retail level. Alberta and British 
Columbia show how it can be done. If Ontario were to follow the 
example of these provinces, all marijuana sales would have to go 
through a Cannabis Control Board of Ontario. But instead of the board 
having a monopoly at the retail level, it could contract out sales of 
marijuana to independent sales agents.

Even if Ontario decides to have some element of government monopoly 
over cannabis distribution, there is no reason why that government 
monopoly needs to extend to the retail level. The experience of other 
provinces suggests that allowing more competition at the retail level 
could lead to lower costs and promote retail service that is more 
responsive to customer needs.
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MAP posted-by: Jay Bergstrom