Pubdate: Sun, 19 Jul 2015
Source: San Diego Union Tribune (CA)
Copyright: 2015 Union-Tribune Publishing Co.
Contact:  http://www.utsandiego.com/
Details: http://www.mapinc.org/media/386
Note: Seldom prints LTEs from outside it's circulation area.
Author: By David A. Shirk
Note: Shirk directs the Master's Program in International Relations 
and the Justice in Mexico Program (www.justiceinmexico.org)

DRUGLORD'S ESCAPE SHOULD LEAD TO BETTER U.S.-MEXICO COOPERATION

The capture of Joaquin "El Chapo (Shorty)" Guzman in February 2014 
was lauded at home and abroad as one of the most important 
accomplishments of Mexican President Enrique Pena Nieto, who restored 
Mexico's longtime ruling party to power after a 12-year hiatus. 
However, on July 11, 2015, Guzman escaped from Mexico's top 
maximum-security prison.

Now, one of Pena Nieto's greatest feats is widely seen as his 
greatest failure, and a possible setback to U.S.-Mexico relations. 
Since Guzman's escape through a 1.5-kilometer ventilated tunnel, 
pundits are debating who is to blame and what comes next in the fight 
against Mexican organized crime.

Because Guzman escaped a previous prison stint in 2001, Pena Nieto 
had pledged to prevent another jailbreak, saying this would be 
utterly "unforgivable." Now, Guzman's "elective departure" is clearly 
just one more illustration of the institutional weakness of Mexico's 
criminal justice system.

Despite years of effort, Mexico's much-anticipated judicial reforms 
won't go into full effect nationally until 2016, and may require 
another decade or more to bear fruit. Guzman's escape thus 
underscores that a long-term commitment to reforming the 
administration of justice remains a priority. In particular, as 
Mexico's prisons require swift and careful attention to prevent 
similar jailbreaks and mayhem.

Of course, we knew all this when Guzman was rearrested, which is why 
many analysts  myself included  pushed for Guzman's extradition to 
the United States. Simply put, because of the power and impunity they 
have at home, extradition is often the only surefire endgame to a 
drug trafficker's career, short of death.

Yet despite criticisms of Mexican foot-dragging, the formal U.S. 
request package for extradition was completed just weeks before 
Guzman's escape. Subsequent technical, legal and administrative 
complications would have delayed Guzman's extradition for years, as 
was the case for the extraditions of Osiel Cardenas Guillen in 2007, 
Mario Villanueva in 2010 and Benjamin Arellano Felix in 2011. Thus, 
to be effective, a more streamlined U.S.-Mexico extradition process 
is clearly needed.

Meanwhile, Guzman's escape clearly adds further uncertainty to 
Mexico's already unpredictable security situation, which had seemed 
to improve in recent years. Will Guzman go quietly into retirement, 
get back into business, and/or spark a new wave of violence against 
those responsible for his capture? Whatever his next move, what will 
U.S. and Mexican officials do in the face of such a serious setback?

Here, Colombia's experience is worth noting, given parallels to the 
1992 escape of Pablo Escobar, once the world's "most notorious drug 
trafficker." Escobar's 1991 surrender was negotiated by Colombian 
President Cesar Gaviria's government. Many suspect that Guzman's 
capture was similarly negotiated (albeit clandestinely) to appease 
U.S. officials. This seems doubtful, since a pact to temporarily 
detain Guzman would be a terrible deal for Pena Nieto. It would be 
more politically damaging to catch Guzman and let him go than to 
never capture him at all.

In Colombia, though, the embarrassment over Escobar's escape made him 
the subject of an intense U.S.-Colombian manhunt that led to his 
killing a year and a half later. Guzman's escape could and should 
prompt a renewed sense of urgency for U.S.-Mexican cooperation in 
both countries.

Since 2007, the mechanism for such cooperation has been the Merida 
Initiative, a nearly $300 million-$400 million annual U.S. assistance 
package somewhat similar to Plan Colombia. While much Merida funding 
supports law enforcement activities, some also supports criminal 
justice reform. For example, the University of San Diego's Justice in 
Mexico program currently receives Merida funding to prepare Mexican 
law schools for the transition to oral, adversarial trial procedures next year.

Yet in recent years, official enthusiasm for the Merida Initiative 
has faded. In Mexico, the Pena Nieto administration appeared wary 
about the level of U.S. influence permitted under President Felipe 
Calderon (2006-12). At the same time, many U.S. officials have 
appeared to lose their interest and sense of urgency for continued 
funding of the program, due partly to ongoing concerns about 
corruption in Mexico, getaways by other major organized crime figures 
(like Rafael Caro Quintero), and human rights abuses in Mexico, 
including the 2015 Tlatlaya and Ayotzinapa massacres.

It will be up to Roberta Jacobson  a career diplomat, longtime 
steward of the Merida Initiative, and Obama's current nominee for 
U.S. ambassador to Mexico  to make the case for continued and better 
U.S.-Mexico cooperation. If there is to be hope for getting "Shorty" 
again  and getting U.S.-Mexico cooperation back on track  the U.S. 
Senate must move swiftly to approve her nomination.

Some say we must also revise our approach to drug control policy, 
with less emphasis on criminalization of drug use and more emphasis 
on preventing the negative public health consequences of drug abuse. 
Uruguay, the United States and other countries are taking the first 
steps in this direction. Yet to reduce the relative power of 
organized crime, we must also address the weaknesses of Mexico's 
criminal justice system noted above.

In the end, Guzman's escape shows that there are no shortcuts to 
improving citizen security and the rule of law in Mexico, and 
underscores why continued U.S.-Mexico security cooperation is needed, 
now more than ever. The current crisis offers a newfound opportunity 
to work together toward that end.
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MAP posted-by: Jay Bergstrom