Pubdate: Sat, 25 Apr 2015
Source: Honolulu Star-Advertiser (HI)
Copyright: 2015 Star Advertiser
Contact: 
http://www.staradvertiser.com/info/Star-Advertiser_Letter_to_the_Editor.html
Website: http://www.staradvertiser.com/
Details: http://www.mapinc.org/media/5154
Author: Jacob Sullum, Creators Syndicate

'ANALOG DRUG' LAW VIOLATES DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENT

Back in 1986, Congress passed the Controlled Substance Analogue 
Enforcement Act, a law aimed at "designer drugs" that were similar to 
illegal compounds but different enough to escape prohibition.

Nearly three decades later, the government is still scrambling to 
keep up with the output of creative underground chemists, banning one 
psychoactive substance after another, only to find substitutes 
already on the market.

As a case the Supreme Court heard on Tuesday illustrates, the analog 
drug law failed because it tried to do the impossible.

It tried to stop people from achieving unsanctioned states of 
consciousness by banning chemicals based on criteria vague enough to 
cover unknown substances yet specific enough to give fair notice of 
which actions would lead to prosecution.

The Supreme Court case involves Stephen McFadden, a Staten Island 
entrepreneur who was indicted in 2012 for supplying synthetic 
stimulants to retailers who sold them as "bath salts."

McFadden had been careful to avoid chemicals that were listed as 
controlled substances, and the stimulants he was charged with 
distributing - 4-MEC, MDPV and methylone - were not explicitly banned 
by federal law when he sold them.

McFadden nevertheless was convicted and sentenced to 33 months in 
prison under the analog drug act, which applies to compounds sold for 
human consumption that are "substantially similar" to forbidden 
substances in chemical structure and actual or intended effects.

The law says such "controlled substance analogues" should be treated 
like the drugs they resemble.

Still, to be convicted of selling a controlled substance, you have to 
do so "knowingly or intentionally," and it's not clear what that 
means in this context.

McFadden's lawyers argue, reasonably enough, that you shouldn't be 
convicted of selling an analog drug unless you knew you were selling 
an analog drug.

The problem is that the analog drug statute does not define 
"substantial similarity," a crucial yet subjective feature on which a 
chemical's legal status hinges.

Experts will disagree, as they did during McFadden's trial, about 
whether a given compound is substantially similar to a listed 
substance and therefore qualifies as an analog - a legal question 
disguised as a scientific one.

As the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit observed in 2005, "a 
substance's legal status as a controlled substance analogue is not a 
fact that a defendant can know conclusively ex ante; it is a fact 
that the jury must find at trial."

That situation hardly seems consistent with the due process 
requirement that a criminal law be clear enough for ordinary people 
to understand what it prohibits.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit, which upheld 
McFadden's conviction, was untroubled by the fact that he had no way 
of knowing in advance whether he was committing a crime. The court 
said it was enough to show he knew people would consume the 
substances he was selling - a reading of the law that would make 
felons out of innocent individuals who distribute vitamins, cocktails 
or cookies without realizing they contain analog drugs.

The Justice Department, which is asking the Supreme Court to uphold 
the 4th Circuit's ruling, nevertheless concedes that the appeals 
court was wrong about the knowledge requirement.

But the DOJ argues that someone can be convicted of selling an analog 
drug if his behavior and comments suggest he knows the product is "a 
regulated or illegal substance," even if he does not know why.

The government complains that McFadden's reading of the analog drug 
act makes prosecutions harder, but that is beside the point. If 
Congress insists on telling grownups what substances they may not 
consume, the least it can do is specify the substances.

In this case, legislators had no particular drugs in mind. They 
merely anticipated that no matter what substances they banned, new 
ones would take their place.

Perhaps it is time to reconsider this never-ending game of catch-up, 
which drives producers and consumers away from familiar intoxicants 
and toward exotic ones that may prove more dangerous.
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MAP posted-by: Jay Bergstrom