Pubdate: Tue, 17 Apr 2012
Source: Korea Times (South Korea)
Copyright: 2012 Korea Times
Contact:  http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/
Details: http://www.mapinc.org/media/916
Author: Juan Gabriel Tokatlian
Note: Juan Gabriel Tokatlian is professor of international relations 
at the Universidad di Tella in Buenos Aires. For more stories, visit 
Project Syndicate ( www.project-syndicate.org).

BEATING DRUG-WAR ADDICTION

BUENOS AIRES - In January, U.S. President Barack Obama nominated 
Marine Corps Lieutenant General John F. Kelly to head the United 
States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM). Based in Miami, Fla., 
USSOUTHCOM runs military operations throughout Latin America and the 
Caribbean, and is the key U.S. "drug warrior" in the region. Across 
the region, the key question, among civilian and military leaders 
alike, is whether the change in commanders will bring with it a 
change in focus.

The top priority for USSOUTHCOM is to fight narcotics trafficking 
from the Andes to the Rio Grande. With the Cold War's end, fighting 
communism was no longer the U.S. armed forces main objective; 
USSOUTHCOM increasingly concentrated on pursuing coercive anti-drug 
initiatives, and funds to fight the drug war were plentiful. But the 
change in commanders is an opportunity for the U.S. to revise, at 
long last, its regional doctrine in order to address other pressing 
security needs.

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 paradoxically reinforced 
the U.S. military's focus on countering illicit drug traffickers. 
While other U.S. forces became heavily involved in the "war on 
terrorism," USSOUTHCOM scaled up its "war on drugs," with its 
commanders targeting the industry's bosses in the Andes, Mexico, and 
Central America.

That happened in part because, following 9/11, Latin America was the 
only region of the world that did not witness an attack by 
transnational terrorists linked to al-Qaeda, so there seemed to be 
little need to pursue counter-terrorist activity there. And, with the 
U.S. continuing to be the world's largest market for illegal drugs, 
its leaders' focus on the drug war in Latin America does not appear 
misguided, at least not on the surface.

That focus has not only made USSOUTHCOM a major recipient of federal 
funds, but has also turned it into something akin to an autonomous 
drug-fighting agency. From the region's perspective, USSOUTHCOM 
appears to be a vaguely "independent" military arm of U.S. 
policymakers' global anti-drug strategy, with scant accountability or 
congressional oversight, and with significant resources for 
aggressive anti-drug operations.

Indeed, USSOUTHCOM has controlled 75 percent of the more than $12 
billion that the U.S. government has allocated to anti-drug 
activities in Latin America and the Caribbean since 2000. But, 
despite this expensive military campaign, all evidence shows that the 
"war on drugs" has been a fiasco.

The failure has been dramatic. In Mexico, roughly 48,000 people have 
been killed in drug-related violence since Felipe Calderon was 
elected President in 2006. And Mexico is not alone. Drug-trafficking 
activities have grown significantly throughout Central America and 
the Caribbean, fueling an unprecedented increase in the murder rate 
which has doubled in countries like Guatemala and Jamaica over the last decade.

Moreover, the cultivation, processing, and trafficking of cocaine and 
heroin continues throughout the Andean Ridge, despite tough 
eradication measures and extradition of traffickers by the U.S. 
Simultaneously, new transshipment routes (via Ecuador in the Pacific 
and Venezuela in the Atlantic) have developed, while drug barons, 
coca growers, and warlords have proliferated.

South America's southern cone especially Argentina and Chile has not 
been immune to the vast expansion of organized crime, money 
laundering, and demand for narcotics elsewhere in the region. And, 
throughout Latin America, the situation has only worsened since the 
1990s. Indeed, Latin American countries' U.S.-backed fight against 
drugs has had universally destructive consequences in terms of 
civil-military relations, human-rights violations, and corruption.

The U.S. cannot deny this disaster. Its drug warriors must reevaluate 
their position and terminate what has become an increasingly 
senseless and futile struggle. Thus, the most critical question 
facing Kelly as he assumes his new command is whether he can redefine 
USSOUTHCOM's role in the fight against illegal drugs.

The military and political challenges are significant, the risks are 
considerable, and the benefits are uncertain. But if USSOUTHCOM does 
not implement major changes in how it prosecutes the drug war, the 
U.S. will find itself facing an increasingly volatile and dangerous 
set of neighbors to the south.
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MAP posted-by: Jay Bergstrom