Pubdate: Sat, 1 Mar 2008 Source: Vancouver Sun (CN BC) Copyright: 2008 The Vancouver Sun Contact: http://www.canada.com/vancouver/vancouversun/ Details: http://www.mapinc.org/media/477 Author: Peter McKnight, Vancouver Sun Cited: British Columbia Centre for Excellence in HIV/AIDS http://www.cfenet.ubc.ca Bookmark: http://www.mapinc.org/topic/Insite (Insite) Bookmark: http://www.mapinc.org/find?142 (Supervised Injection Sites) WHEN SCIENCE RUNS INTO AN IDEOLOGICAL WALL The Canadian Government Has Been Taken to Task for Its Lack of Support For, or Knowledge Of, Scientific Research While it's usually a badge of distinction to have your work cited in a top-flight academic journal, the federal government wasn't exactly in a celebratory mood after two recent journal editorials discussed the feds' attitude toward science. That's because the journals had little good to say about the government's lack of support for, or knowledge of, scientific research. As far as lack of support is concerned, Nature magazine cited the government's recent decision to eliminate its science adviser position, its muzzling of Environment Canada scientists, and its putative failure to adequately fund research as evidence of "the government's manifest disregard for science." And as for a lack of knowledge, scientists at the B.C. Centre for Excellence in HIV/AIDS took Health Minister Tony Clement to task in The Lancet Infectious Diseases for Clement's apparent inability to distinguish between peer-reviewed medical literature and an opinion piece appearing on the website of a lobby group. The Lancet Infectious Diseases article followed an earlier editorial published last year in the online journal Open Medicine. That editorial, written by University of Toronto medical professor Stephen Hwang and endorsed by more than 130 scientists, argued that the government's approach to Vancouver's supervised injection site reveals "that scientific evidence is about to be trumped by ideology." These are damning charges. And there is no question that the government has been less than supportive of any scientific evidence that conflicts with its ideology. This is a serious problem, since preferring to see the world as you think it ought to be (ideology) instead of the way it is (the scientific evidence) can be fatal, not just for governments, but for everyone. Yet there is substantial evidence that ideology influences our assessment of scientific evidence, particularly when one's views are ideologically entrenched. In one experiment, social psychologist Charles Lord divided students into two groups -- one made up those who were the most ardent supporters of capital punishment, and the other of the most ardent opponents of the death penalty. Lord then gave half of the students in each group a set of studies showing that the death penalty acted as a deterrent, and the other half in each group received studies showing that capital punishment had no deterrent effect. Now, were the students acting rationally, we would expect those who received evidence contrary to their views to soften their positions somewhat. But the opposite happened -- both the supporters and opponents of capital punishment strengthened their views upon receiving contrary evidence. In effect, the students explained away the contrary evidence -- and justified their original positions -- by criticizing the methods of those studies that failed to support their ideologies. More recently, Donald Braman and Dan Kahan of Yale University, in a paper titled More Statistics, Less Persuasion: A Cultural Theory of Gun Risk Perceptions, found that people's positions on gun control are determined by their cultural worldviews. Much as in the death penalty study, the researchers concluded that "individuals can be expected to credit or dismiss empirical evidence on 'gun control risks' depending on whether it coheres or conflicts with their cultural values." These are troubling findings because they suggest people behave in a manner exactly the opposite of that prescribed by science, which dictates that we test and modify our theories on the basis of the evidence, rather than interpreting the evidence in light of our theories. But given that this is how many people -- and many governments -- behave, and given the importance of allowing scientific evidence to inform government policy, it's essential that we find ways of developing a rapprochement between researchers and policy-makers. Fortunately, there is a wealth of literature on what is called "research transfer" or "knowledge utilization." Much of this literature has been written by Canadians, including many in the employ of the federal government. In one important paper titled Connecting Research and Policy, Canadian Health Services Research Foundation CEO Jonathan Lomas notes that many factors influence government decision-making, including interests (how one would like the world to work), ideologies (how one thinks the world ought to work) and beliefs (how one thinks the world actually does work.) Of these three, Lomas argues that beliefs are the only factor likely to be changed as a result of information, and even then, information comprises much more than just scientific research, as it also includes "anecdotes, experience and even propaganda." Further, beliefs typically take a long time -- often years -- to change, and then only after "repeated exposure from competing sources of information." Given this reality, how can we make governments more responsive to scientific research? Perhaps most importantly, Lomas notes both researchers and policy-makers must have a better understanding of each others' domains. In particular, both scientists and decision-makers tend to view the others' field as a product rather than a process. Government policy-makers, for example, typically see science as a "retail store" that provides them with just the product they need when they want it. A good example of this view came from Tony Clement when he begrudgingly extended the supervised injection site's lease on life, saying that he needed more "facts" about the site's effect on lowering drug use and fighting addiction. While science can provide such information, Clement's words reveal that he sees science as a retail store rather than as an activity, a process. The problem with this approach is that it virtually guarantees that researchers and policy-makers will come into contact with each other only at the moment a decision is made, and researchers will present their findings only after the policy agenda "has been framed within a particular context . . . and often after the limits have been set around feasible options." And as the government's approach to the supervised injection site -- and the study of students and the death penalty -- make clear, it's highly unlikely scientific research will change the beliefs of policy-makers at such a late stage in the process, particularly when the government holds ideologically entrenched views. If, on the other hand, policy-makers view science as a process, and maintain regular contact with scientists, they can influence the "conceptualization and conduct of a study" and are also more likely to allow the study's results to inform policy. Similarly, if scientists view policy-making as a process, and maintain regular contact with policy-makers, they stand a much better chance of influencing the policy agenda and framing the issues, which again increases the chances that their results will inform policy. For these reasons, the Canadian government has placed considerable emphasis on research transfer, and has developed many linkages between researchers and policy-makers. This close relationship might explain why many bureaucrats within the government have been influenced by the research on the supervised injection site. The problem, of course, is that government policy is ultimately set by the cabinet ministers and the prime minister, who continue to view science as a retail store. And until that changes, the government will continue to make the pages of academic journals, for all the wrong reasons. - --- MAP posted-by: Richard Lake