Pubdate: Sun, 27 Jan 2008
Source: Statesman Journal (Salem, OR)
Copyright: 2008 Creators Syndicate
Contact:  http://www.statesmanjournal.com/
Details: http://www.mapinc.org/media/427
Author: Austin Bay
Note: Austin Bay, an author and colonel (retired) in the U.S. Army 
Reserve, writes for Creators Syndicate
Bookmark: http://www.mapinc.org/opinion.htm (Opinion)

MEXICO ELEVATES DRUG FIGHT TO WAR

In December 2006, the government of newly inaugurated Mexican
President Felipe Calderon decided to treat the problem posed by
Mexico's drug cartels as a military as well as criminal challenge.

That has an echo of Colombia, where its leftist guerrillas have gone
into the drug business. But it is an echo. While Mexico and Colombia
have some similarities, there are a number of differences, the chief
one being the Mexican federal government is much stronger than Colombia's.

Is a drug war a genuine war? A dictionary debate may be in order, but
police and special operations soldiers know gang warfare often
straddles the line between crime and insurgent warfare. Take Iraq as
an example. Iraqi crime syndicates have participated in political
kidnappings. Their first interest is money, but bribing political
leaders and doing favors for terrorists (in exchange for cash)
undermines civil society.

Mexican gangs are certainly spilling gallons of blood. Gangland-type
executions in Mexico have increased dramatically since 2001. It's not
that these executions didn't take place in 2001 -- about 110 were
reported. However, in 2007 period an estimated 2,500 took place.

Mexican drug cartels have enormous financial resources and the ability
to corrupt entire police departments. On a daily basis, the
cartelistas employ murder and torture as business tools.

The existence of sophisticated, highly trained and very well-armed
paramilitary organizations such as the Gulf drug cartel's Zetas is one
reason Calderon's counter-cartel war plan relies on the Mexican Army.
The army is better trained than the police, less corrupt and generally
trusted by the Mexican people. The army also has weapons as good (if
not better) than the drug cartels.

Mexico also faces an armed "proto-insurgency" using terrorist tactics
to advance its political agenda. In mid-2007, the Popular
Revolutionary Army (EPR) launched a violent wave of bomb attacks on
PEMEX facilities. The EPR has existed under various names for at least
three decades. This "new EPR" portrays itself as a "socialist" and
"proletarian movement" -- rhetoric with Cold War echoes.

The EPR has attacked targets in central and eastern Mexico. The
attacks in eastern Mexico closed a major gas pipeline that shut down
production at several major factories. The Mexican government
estimated that pipeline attack cost the Mexican economy $150 million a
day in lost production, which was precisely the EPR's goal.

The EPR's violent revival, in the midst of Calderon's war on the
cartels, may or may not be a coincidence. Many Mexicans and military
analysts don't think so. The revolutionaries need money, and the drug
cartels have money. It's a traditional marriage of convenience made in
hell.

Over the past 13 months, the army and federal police task forces have
used both counter-insurgency warfare tactics and law enforcement
techniques in counter-cartel operations. At times, the
counter-insurgency tactics have taken precedence over traditional
police-type anti-crime measures.

The Mexican government believes its war on the cartels has been a
tentative success. In September 2007, Calderon gave his first "state
of the union" speech. Calderon said that the Mexican military and
police forces have gained "momentum" in the war. He noted that 200
Mexican soldiers and policemen had died in the past year and half at
the hands of drug cartels and organized criminals.

Mexican officials, including Calderon, caution that the war will
continue for a long, long time. However, his government ultimately
hopes that battle will be fought by honest, reliable police forces
instead of the military. 
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MAP posted-by: Richard Lake