Pubdate: Thu, 13 Jul 2006
Source: NOW Magazine (CN ON)
Copyright: 2006 NOW Communications Inc.
Contact:  http://www.nowtoronto.com/
Details: http://www.mapinc.org/media/282

SEEDS OF A SUICIDE MISSION

UK Org Says We're Losing Battle For Afghan Hearts And Minds With 
U.S.-Style Aggression

ON THE RECORD AFGHANISTAN

Excerpted from Canada In Kandahar: No Peace To Keep, a report 
released last month by the London, UK-based Senlis Council, a 
security and development policy group.

Canadian troops and Afghan civilians are paying with their lives for 
Canada's adherence to the U.S. government's failing military and 
counter-narcotics policies in Kandahar.

There does not seem to be any learning process under way. Canadian 
troops have largely failed to assist in the reconstruction and 
economic development of the province.

Poppy eradication is destroying the livelihood of a large part of the 
population, and these crops are not being replaced with sustainable 
and profitable alternatives. Even if Canadian soldiers avoid actively 
supporting the U.S.-backed Afghan national eradication campaigns, 
Canadians are still seen as complicit in the destruction of livelihoods.

Canada is at war in Afghanistan, not keeping the peace. Canadian 
troops are fighting increasingly deadly operations against the 
resurgent Taliban. Kandahar is a war zone.

Countless civilians have been killed in incidents involving Canadian 
or American troops, complicating Canada's secondary mission objective 
winning the hearts and minds of the local population. The deaths of 
innocent Kandahar civilians at the hands of the Canadian military 
have come to symbolize to the local population Canadian indifference 
to the Afghan people.

It is necessary to dramatically change the focus of the international 
community's approach [and] to completely rethink the policy 
objectives and priorities.

Southern Afghanistan urgently needs an injection of financial aid 
earmarked for the short-term relief of conditions of extreme poverty.

There is an urgent need for Canadians and the international community 
to immediately and significantly engage with all stakeholders in 
Kandahar and to stimulate a shared sense of ownership of Kandahar's 
reconstruction and development process.

Canada should organize a broad series of local jirga-style meetings, 
in accordance with local customs, between farmers' representatives, 
community leaders and the international community in Kandahar.

Instead of implementing futile yet politically expedient 
crop-eradication-centred drug policies, the international community 
must open the way for new pragmatic approaches. The best short-term 
solution is assisting the country to produce essential opium-based 
medicines such as morphine and codeine in accordance with the legal 
framework found in the new Afghanistan Counter-Narcotics Law passed 
in December 2005.

Implementing these provisions would partly bring illegal poppy 
cultivation under control and would also provide economic 
opportunities and hope to the poverty-stricken poppy-growing areas.

When Canada took command of the Kandahar Provincial Reconstruction 
Team, the troops made efforts to distinguish themselves from American 
troops, who are viewed by locals with extreme hostility. However, the 
initial goodwill generated by these attempts quickly evaporated.

According to the Canadian Department of National Defence, the 
majority of Canadian soldiers in Kandahar (at least 2,000) work 
solely with the U.S. army in patrols and security work, and do not 
carry out much reconstruction or development work.

Some locals state that they see the Canadian troops as overly 
aggressive, indifferent, militaristic and lacking communication 
skills. Insurgents' guerrilla fighting has forced the Canadians into 
a heavily armed posture that alienates the people: Canadian convoys 
race at top speed through Kandahar, "like mice running from hole to 
hole" according to locals.

Our interviewees state that the Canadian prime minister travelled to 
Kandahar but went directly from the airport to the military base. 
They stressed Prime Minister Harper's failure to properly meet with 
locals in accordance with Afghan customs, or to speak to them about 
their views of the Canadian presence in the province. This was widely 
remarked upon as improper, insulting to Afghan pride and an 
indication of cowardice on his part.

Incidents such as the March shooting of a taxi passenger for driving 
too close to a Canadian military vehicle and the lack of a proper 
local response to that incident have caused deep hostility in the community.

Creating additional difficulties for the Canadian troops is [the 
fact] that the majority of the military vehicles and convoys travel 
without flags, preventing differentiation between the actions of 
U.S., Canadian military and the private military companies involved 
in poppy eradication (DynCorp).

Although almost without exception the local actors from the 
international community are deeply concerned about the living 
conditions and future of the local population, many of them privately 
expressed their inability to produce positive results for the region 
given the dynamics between locals and the U.S. military and 
counter-narcotics operations.

In Kandahar City itself, foreign aid workers live in security 
compounds, travel to work in offices in secured compounds and rarely 
travel on the streets of Kandahar or out into the villages. When they 
do, most travel in convoys with armoured vehicles and highly visible 
armed escorts, which creates further tension and distance with the 
local population.

On 14 March 2006, Canadian soldiers in Kandahar shot and killed a 
passenger in Kandahar City. Nasrat Ali Hassan, a father of six, was 
travelling home with his family after an evening visiting relatives.

A spokesman for the Canadian Forces, Lt. Col. Derek Basinger, said 
that Hassan was not treated at the Canadian base because the Canadian 
troops on the scene believed his wounds were not life-threatening. 
Hassan was taken to the Kandahar hospital and died hours later.

The story of his death spread quickly through Kandahar. So far, the 
family has not received a formal apology from Canadian 
representatives, which is necessary under Afghan customs, nor has the 
Canadian government offered support to the family.

This incident and the lack of an apology or compensation was 
mentioned repeatedly in interviews in Kandahar about the community's 
current negative perception of the Canadian presence.

Such incidents prompt further support for the insurgent groups. 
Without solid local support, both stability and security will remain 
an illusion.
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MAP posted-by: Jay Bergstrom