Pubdate: Tue, 01 Jan 2002 Source: Le Monde (France) Copyright: by Le Monde, Paris 2002 Contact: http://www.lemonde.fr/ Details: http://www.mapinc.org/media/235 Author: Janette Habel LATIN AMERICA RECOLONISED US Demands A Secure, Compliant Hemisphere Revolt in Argentina, clashes in Bolivia, violent disputes over land in Brazil, trade unionists murdered in Colombia, and a general strike in Venezuela: Latin America has been exasperated by 20 years of ultra- liberalism. Now the US is using its fight against global terrorism as a pretext for a military response to unrest in the Americas. "The key question about the defence of the American hemisphere is: what is the threat? In the past, the Americas faced a relatively well- defined threat that the average American could understand (1). Today that threat has become infinitely more complex and more difficult to define." That was Professor Lewis Arthur Tambs, diplomat, historian, professor at Arizona State University and the author of a report on the future of the Americas, summarised in nine points the nine Ds the guiding principles for the hemisphere's security before 11 September. (They are defence, drugs, demography, debt, deindustrialisation, populist post-cold war democracy, destabilisation, deforestation and the decline of the United States (2). There is no T in this alphabet of security terrorism is classified under drugs, narcoterrorism being "the alliance between terrorist organisations, drug traffickers and organised crime, a deadly symbiosis destroying the vital elements of western civilisation". But the war against drugs occupies a central place, for the Clinton administration was accused of failing to keep its promises to eradicate drug trafficking. Populist democracy refers to the Venezuelan government of President Hugo Chavez, and demography to the risk to the US from migration (the most recent US census underlines the growth in the Hispanic population, 58% in 10 years, more than 35m people). To understand this definition of US security, we must start with the post-cold war disappearance of the "communist threat". After the fall of the dictatorships in the 1980s, the return to democracy was accompanied by a short-lived stability as political openness and the market economy raised hopes. But since the 1990s free-market democracy has declined, social crises have worsened and instability returned. Economic and financial crises Mexico in 1995, Brazil and Ecuador in 1999, Argentina now have had disastrous consequences and social and political conditions caused protests. These include big demonstrations by peasants in Bolivia, an uprising by the indigenous population in Ecuador and the toppling of President Fernando de la Rua in Argentina (see article by Carlos Gabetta). Civil war in Colombia threatens to destabilise the whole region while the Chavez government irritates Washington. Although the US is not threatened militarily by an enemy power, these troubles renewed security concerns. Defined as "non-traditional transnational threats", terrorism, drug trafficking, mass migration and environmental degradation are the new enemy. The political and economic instability that has served historically to legitimise intervention by the US and other countries is re-emerging as a potential threat to regional security, according to US researchers Joseph Tulchin and Ralph Espach (3). This is especially the case now the war against Colombian insurgents, who control almost half Colombian territory, looks likely to spread to Venezuela, Panama, Ecuador and Brazil, heightening tension and bringing more troops to the borders. The sources say US policy towards Colombia is to extend the conflict. A New Security Architecture It is becoming urgent for the US to respond to these non-traditional threats now that the House of Representatives has approved the Trade Promotion Authority ("fast track") and that the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) is being established. The Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) finds a close relationship between the construction of the FTAA and a new "security architecture in the Americas" (4). It reports that economic change has been more rapid than change in security, provoking a rise in violence from populations who survive illegally. Since the countries of the Americas are considered too weak to meet that challenge alone, they must develop a coherent defence policy for the hemisphere, defining the aims and institutions necessary to strengthen inter-American security. The events of 11 September should help by speeding the reforms, already started, to continental institutions created at the start of the cold war. Ten days after the Twin Towers fell, there was an extraordinary meeting of the Organisation of American States (OAS) to discuss a response, at which the Argentine foreign minister said: "The Inter-American Mutual Assistance Treaty (TIAR) is fully in force and up to date. It allows us to discuss the rules and create a political framework for any military response." His words surprised. All the countries in the hemisphere (except Cuba) belong to the Treaty, which dates to 1947. It has not been invoked since the Falklands war between Britain and Argentina in 1982, when Washington refused to implement it and backed London, showing contempt for the letter of the treaty, which states that an attack on one member must be considered an attack on them all. (Similar to Article 5 of the Nato treaty.) By coincidence, a few days before the 11 September attacks, Mexican president Vicente Fox had described the TIAR as out of date and useless. The Argentine reference to the TIAR was nevertheless approved unanimously by the foreign ministers convened by Brazilian president Fernando Enrique Cardoso; the governments of the continent believed the attacks of 11 September were a threat to the family of the Americas and the hemisphere's security. Last June the OAS general assembly failed to reach agreement on adopting the inter-American democratic charter, which "legitimises a right to interfere". It was adopted by acclamation and without debate at the OAS assembly in Lima in September, although there are serious reservations about some of its articles. Intended to "preserve and strengthen representative democracy", in particular against attempted coups, the charter's rules are ambiguous enough to allow a right to interfere in any member country. If the government of a member state considers that "its democratic political institutional process or its legitimate exercise of power is at risk, it may request assistance from the secretary general or the permanent council for the strengthening and preservation of its democratic system". The OAS permanent council may then "adopt measures for the preservation of the democratic system or its strengthening" and, if it finds that system has been "altered", it may "adopt the decisions it deems appropriate", "including the undertaking of diplomatic initiatives." The word including is vague. Who says what an "alteration of the constitutional regime" really means? Roger Noriega, the US permanent representative to the OAS, has stressed that "resolutions approved by the OAS are not rhetoric; they provide the framework for action. They represent legislation that sets policy for the OAS member governments" (5). But who has the power to take decisions in an organisation that has just demonstrated its alignment with the US hyperpower? Preventive Diplomacy President Clinton's assistant secretary of state for western hemisphere affairs, Peter Romero, called in 2000 for the creation of a responsible for monitoring the employment of multinational forces and ensuring effective linkage between political and military authorities. That is what some call recolonisation. Janette Habel is lecturer at the university of Marne-la-Vallee and the Institut des hautes etudes d'Amerique latine (IHEAL) (1) This means the fight against "communist subversion", which was used to justify support for dictatorships. (2) James P Lucier, "Santa Fe IV Latinoamerica hoy", United States Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, Washington, 2000. (3) Joseph Tulchin and Ralph Espach, "A call for strategic thinking", in Latin America in the new international system, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder (US) and London, 2001. (4) Toward a new security architecture in the Americas. The strategic implications of the FTAA, Patrice M Franko, The CSIS Press, Vol. XXII, No 3, Washington, 2000. (5) Roger Noriega, "The Western hemisphere alliance: the OAS and US interests", Heritage Foundation Lecture, Washington, 20 November 2001. (6) Inter-American Defence Board, Towards a new hemispheric security system, Washington, 6 September 2001. (7) See Patrice M Franko, op cit. (8) "Menaces americaines sur la base d'Alcantara au Bresil", Espaces Latinos, No 188, Lyon, November 2001. (9) Chiapas al dia, Ciepac, Mexico City, 21 November 2001. (10) Patrice M Franko, op cit. (11) Edouard Bailby, Espaces latinos, No 187, Lyon, October 2001. (12) Pagina12.com.ar; 21 September 2001. (13) Brazil, Chile, Peru, Ecuador, Paraguay, Uruguay, Bolivia, Argentina and the United States. Translated by Malcolm Greenwood - --- MAP posted-by: Beth