Pubdate: Sat, 03 Feb 2001 Source: Economist, The (UK) Copyright: 2001 The Economist Newspaper Limited Contact: 111 West 57th Street, New York NY 10019 (US office) Fax: (212) 541 9378 Website: http://www.economist.com/ UNCLE SAM IN COLOMBIA Of all the foreign-policy quagmires President George Bush has inherited, few are as muddy as the mess in Colombia. Alarmed by rising coca cultivation and by the strength of the leftist guerrillas in a country that produces most of the world's cocaine, the Clinton administration boldly stepped into Colombia's complex internal conflicts. It granted $1.3 billion in mainly military aid last year for "Plan Colombia", a wider bundle of security and development projects drawn up by President Andres Pastrana's government. Should Mr Bush continue with, scrap or amend this policy? Most of the American aid is meant to be spent on training three new army battalions and equipping them with helicopters. Their mission is to stop the FARC, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, from hindering anti-drug operations in Putumayo, on Colombia's border with Ecuador, where roughly half the coca crop is grown. Two of the battalions are already protecting police spraying the coca plantations with herbicides. It is also hoped that, if the FARC can be denied drug income, it will be more inclined to make peace. Several things have changed since the plan was first mooted. First, the United States' aid has been widely seen as a crude intervention in its Latin American backyard. As a result, European governments, which Mr Pastrana had unrealistically hoped might stump up some $2 billion in aid for social and development projects, aimed at providing alternatives to coca, have offered only $280m--leaving Plan Colombia looking unbalanced. Second, the peace talks with the FARC launched by Mr Pastrana in 1998 have stalled. As the FARC has continued its tactics of kidnapping, extortion and attacks on small towns, public support for the talks has plunged. This week their future hangs in the balance: Mr Pastrana has delayed until Sunday a decision on ending or extending the life of a "demilitarised" zone for the guerrillas (ie, a haven all their own), as he seeks gestures from the FARC. Third, right-wing paramilitaries, often also linked to drugs, have become the fastest-growing military force in Colombia. In a cold-blooded manner, they attack civilians in guerrilla areas, and often act with the collusion of army officers--and with growing public support. Lastly, neighbouring countries worry that Plan Colombia will push refugees, violence and drugs into their countries. That is already happening in Ecuador, which is economically and politically fragile (see article). So far, Mr Bush has expressed support for Plan Colombia. But critics worry that he may be sucked into the quagmire, perhaps even choosing to send troops. In fact, a greater temptation may be to walk away, or to narrow the plan to anti-drug aid to the police, as some Republicans favour. All three approaches would be a mistake. The United States--and Europe--do have responsibilities for peace in Colombia. After all, their drug consumers unwittingly finance both the FARC and the paramilitaries. The best course is to mould Plan Colombia into a more balanced policy, more clearly aimed at strengthening the democratic state. That means continuing to help Colombia to make its armed forces more efficient, more professional and more respectful of human rights, but it also means a police and judiciary able to give security to citizens. Colombia, in turn, has to make a more serious effort to tackle the paramilitaries--though critics of Plan Colombia would do well to note that to do so requires stronger, not weaker, armed forces.The unwinnable war At the same time, the United States should recognise that aerial spraying of other peoples' fields with herbicides is no substitute for failing to stop its own citizens from taking drugs. Manual eradication, backed by social development, may be a better alternative. But Europe should be under no illusions: alternative development requires lots of money. In truth, Plan Colombia is bound to fail if it is just seen as a war on drugs: any "victory" in wiping out Putumayo's coca will simply make the industry move, not disappear. But any aid that helps Colombia and its neighbours achieve peace and strengthen democracy is money well spent. The drug war still looks unwinnable--but at least some of its battles can be made less costly to the countries where they are fought. - --- MAP posted-by: Larry Stevens