Pubdate: Thu, 04 Jan 2001 Source: International Herald-Tribune (France) Copyright: International Herald Tribune 2001 Contact: 181, Avenue Charles de Gaulle, 92521 Neuilly Cedex, France Fax: (33) 1 41 43 93 38 Website: http://www.iht.com/ Note: A Washington Post Editorial CONFUSION IN COLOMBIA In the next few weeks, Colombia's complex conflict with guerrillas and drug traffickers is likely to come to a head, on more than one front. In the jungle-draped southern state of Putamayo, two new U.S.-trained Colombian army battalions are supposed to go into action for the first time in support of a major offensive against the plantations and labs of the cocaine industry, marking the military debut of Plan Colombia, the multibillion-dollar program to combat the narcotics trade. Meanwhile, President Andres Pastrana faces a major crossroads in his brave but feckless attempt to negotiate peace with the rebel groups that control large parts of the countryside and the drug traffic, including most of Putamayo. On Jan. 31, the extended term of a huge safe haven that Mr. Pastrana granted two years ago to the largest insurgent group, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or FARC, expires, and Colombians are clamoring for the government to shut it down. But Mr. Pastrana is instead talking about granting control over a second large chunk of territory to another rebel group, the National Liberation Army, or ELN, which like the FARC has proved less interested in revolution than in profiting from drugs and kidnapping. In short, the Colombian army may spend the next few weeks in tough fighting to take back control of one part of the countryside from guerrilla organizations, even as the government contemplates handing over other parts to some of the same groups. While the military offensive may or may not work, the results of ceding territory are clear. The FARC has used its safe haven to increase drug cultivation, assassinate uncooperative civilians, force children to join its armed forces in new offensives, and hold more than 450 government police and soldiers captive in open-air pens. It has refused to negotiate peace. This bizarre confluence of policies rests on a couple of political fictions to which Mr. Pastrana and the Clinton administration have clung. Despite mounting evidence to the contrary, Mr. Pastrana has stuck to the notion that the FARC and the ELN are conventional insurgent movements with political agendas that can be discussed, and not syndicates whose main interests now center on consolidating control over territory and drug revenues. The Clinton administration, for its part, continues to insist that Plan Colombia and the military operations that go with it are aimed at drug traffickers, and not the insurgents, even though the two are inextricably mixed. The administration also continues to give strong support to Mr. Pastrana and embrace him as a partner in the Plan Colombia project, even though most senior U.S. officials regard his peace initiative as misguided and unworkable. Both governments argue that Colombia's problems are complex and require complicated policies. While that is true, this month's mix of remedies bespeaks less sophisticated complexity than simple confusion. In fact, both governments would do better to acknowledge Colombia's tough realities. Mr. Pastrana should shut down the safe zones for the guerrillas and accept that while some negotiations may be useful, sweeping political treaties will not end the conflict. And the United States should stop pretending that it is only supporting a campaign against the drug traffic in Colombia. If it is to continue training and equipping the Colombian army, the new administration cannot avoid involvement in the larger Colombian conflict. It should have a clearer policy for it. - - THE WASHINGTON POST. - --- MAP posted-by: Jo-D