Pubdate: Thu, 04 Jan 2001
Source: International Herald-Tribune (France)
Copyright: International Herald Tribune 2001
Contact:  181, Avenue Charles de Gaulle, 92521 Neuilly Cedex, France
Fax: (33) 1 41 43 93 38
Website: http://www.iht.com/
Note: A Washington Post Editorial

CONFUSION IN COLOMBIA

In the next few weeks, Colombia's complex conflict with guerrillas and drug 
traffickers is likely to come to a head, on more than one front.

In the jungle-draped southern state of Putamayo, two new U.S.-trained 
Colombian army battalions are supposed to go into action for the first time 
in support of a major offensive against the plantations and labs of the 
cocaine industry, marking the military debut of Plan Colombia, the 
multibillion-dollar program to combat the narcotics trade.

Meanwhile, President Andres Pastrana faces a major crossroads in his brave 
but feckless attempt to negotiate peace with the rebel groups that control 
large parts of the countryside and the drug traffic, including most of 
Putamayo. On Jan. 31, the extended term of a huge safe haven that Mr. 
Pastrana granted two years ago to the largest insurgent group, the 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, or FARC, expires, and Colombians 
are clamoring for the government to shut it down. But Mr. Pastrana is 
instead talking about granting control over a second large chunk of 
territory to another rebel group, the National Liberation Army, or ELN, 
which like the FARC has proved less interested in revolution than in 
profiting from drugs and kidnapping.

In short, the Colombian army may spend the next few weeks in tough fighting 
to take back control of one part of the countryside from guerrilla 
organizations, even as the government contemplates handing over other parts 
to some of the same groups.

While the military offensive may or may not work, the results of ceding 
territory are clear. The FARC has used its safe haven to increase drug 
cultivation, assassinate uncooperative civilians, force children to join 
its armed forces in new offensives, and hold more than 450 government 
police and soldiers captive in open-air pens. It has refused to negotiate 
peace.

This bizarre confluence of policies rests on a couple of political fictions 
to which Mr. Pastrana and the Clinton administration have clung. Despite 
mounting evidence to the contrary, Mr. Pastrana has stuck to the notion 
that the FARC and the ELN are conventional insurgent movements with 
political agendas that can be discussed, and not syndicates whose main 
interests now center on consolidating control over territory and drug 
revenues. The Clinton administration, for its part, continues to insist 
that Plan Colombia and the military operations that go with it are aimed at 
drug traffickers, and not the insurgents, even though the two are 
inextricably mixed. The administration also continues to give strong 
support to Mr. Pastrana and embrace him as a partner in the Plan Colombia 
project, even though most senior U.S. officials regard his peace initiative 
as misguided and unworkable.

Both governments argue that Colombia's problems are complex and require 
complicated policies. While that is true, this month's mix of remedies 
bespeaks less sophisticated complexity than simple confusion.

In fact, both governments would do better to acknowledge Colombia's tough 
realities. Mr. Pastrana should shut down the safe zones for the guerrillas 
and accept that while some negotiations may be useful, sweeping political 
treaties will not end the conflict. And the United States should stop 
pretending that it is only supporting a campaign against the drug traffic 
in Colombia. If it is to continue training and equipping the Colombian 
army, the new administration cannot avoid involvement in the larger 
Colombian conflict. It should have a clearer policy for it.

- - THE WASHINGTON POST.
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