Pubdate: Thu, 17 Aug 2000
Source: Cape Cod Times (MA)
Copyright: 2000 Cape Cod Times.
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Author: Sean Gonsalves
Note: Sean Gonsalves is a Cape Cod Times staff writer and syndicated 
columinist.

LOSING A FUTILE FIGHT

No doubt, we are losing the "war on drugs." That's because the "war" is 
un-winnable. What other conclusion can you reach after assessing it all - 
from a military standpoint, that is?

"Drug warriors do not wish to acknowledge that their 'war' cannot be won. 
Let us look at the military factors of space, time and manpower," writes 
Joseph Miranda, former instructor at the U.S. Army JFK Special Warfare 
Center and editor of Strategy and Tactics magazine.

He then proceeds to explain why it is that "nowhere in prohibition 
advocates' literature can one find a realistic analysis of the armed forces 
required to successfully interdict drug trafficking. The reason such an 
analysis cannot be found is quite simple: the mission itself is impossible."

In 1987, Congress was presented the Review of International Narcotics 
Control Report - an analysis conducted by the Department of Defense 
outlining the military force it would require to secure U.S. borders 
against drug trafficking. A force made up of 96 infantry battalions, 53 
helicopter companies, 210 patrol ships and 110 surveillance aircraft would 
be needed, the report said.

An infantry battalion ranges anywhere from 500 to 1,000 soldiers. And a 
functioning battalion requires several additional support groups - from 
intelligence to logistics units, Miranda says. A helicopter company might 
have anywhere from 15 to 30 aircraft and 200 personnel or so. Other 
"echelons of support" are also necessary.

"The end result is that (this) force would require at least 500,000 or so 
personnel to function in the field," Miranda continues.

There are 6,300 members in SOUTHCOM (Southern Command) - the military wing 
responsible for the Latin American/Caribbean drug region. They are 
considered to be the "front line" in the war on drugs. In 1995, within the 
United States, there were 8,000 active duty and reserve military personnel 
engaged in drug interdiction enforcement. (I don't know what the current 
number is, but it's probably safe to assume it hasn't declined).

Border Patrol, U.S. Customs and the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration 
contribute several thousand more drug cops. But when you add it all up, the 
drug war force comes out to about 12 battalions - only one-eighth of the 96 
battalions that the Defense Department says would be necessary.

"As we see then, to simply carry out the objective of drug interdiction, 
the United States would have to effectively double the size of its current 
armed forces. This would require a massive expenditure of public funds and 
a massive mobilization of manpower. To finance such a campaign, the United 
States would have to increase taxes or engage in deficit spending, yet the 
leaders of both major political parties have continually stated their goals 
as the reduction of taxes and balancing the budget," Miranda explains.

Besides guarding U.S. borders, the "war on drugs" attempts to destroy drug 
crops. This is a military exercise in futility. Take marijuana fields, for 
example. When they are destroyed, it "has no real effect simply because 
growers will move elsewhere or replant the fields when the police withdraw. 
At a minimum, drug enforcement personnel would have to permanently occupy 
all drug-producing regions, not just in America, but worldwide," Miranda says.

One thing Miranda does not examine is the relationship between U.S.-imposed 
economic policies in the Third World and the illicit drug market. When 
small local farmers are put under by giant American agricultural 
corporations, peasants are forced to work the only cash crops available - 
marijuana, coca and opium.

Miranda does, however, recognize the effects of this: "The war on drugs has 
engendered serious anti-American sentiment throughout much of the Third 
World. One of the primary causes of this guerrilla warfare has been peasant 
reaction to U.S.-supported drug enforcement assaults. Anti-drug operations 
have involved spraying herbicides, assaults on the rural populace, and 
assorted violations of basic human rights."

The Andean Commission of Jurists estimates that 70 percent of the political 
murders in Colombia are committed by the armed forces, police and 
paramilitary forces, while only 2 percent are committed by the drug cartels.

"In the face of this assault, the peoples of the drug-producing countries 
have little choice but to organize guerrilla warfare for their own 
survival," Miranda adds.

"Drug warriors constantly tell us that we can not afford to 'lose' the war 
on drugs. But the absurdity of this position can be seen in the fact that 
America is not really fighting the war in the first place. In many ways, 
the war on drugs has allowed certain sectors in American politics to have a 
justification for increasing repression at home and intervention abroad," 
he says.

Sean Gonsalves is a Cape Cod Times staff writer and syndicated columinist. 
He can be reached via email:  ---
MAP posted-by: Larry Stevens